think tank analyses on the Sudan conflict from November 27 - December 18 2023.
Key Takeaways:
It is misleading to consider the conflict a civil war between the SAF and RSF or a power struggle between two generals, as it involves influential foreign actors and transnational elements.
Sudan’s neighbors, regional and international organizations, and states with interests/influence in Sudan should forge common positions so external divisions do not prolong the conflict.
There needs to be increased, immediate attention given to Darfur, where the RSF is committing atrocity crimes reminiscent of the 2003-2005 genocide.
Links to a UN explainer of the situation in Darfur and an account of the situation by a Darfuri journalist:
Misleading to consider the conflict a civil war between the SAF and RSF. It involves transnational elements and influential foreign actors.
The RSF continues to try to control the gold supply chains; it sells gold primarily to its key supporter the UAE. The SAF taxes imports and exports through Port Sudan and sells strategic commodities to Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey.
The conflict reflects geopolitical rivalries, e.g. the UAE (supporting RSF) and Qatar (supporting SAF). Foreign powers leverage Sudan for regional influence. The UAE leverages allies Libya and Chad; the SAF seeks support from Iran and Turkey. This threatens the Jeddah talks.
Fears a ceasefire could partition Sudan with each side declaring its own government.
Policymakers often overlook these transnational dynamics, focusing on state-specific analyses, which hinders effective conflict resolution and development initiatives.
- The RSF, as the Janjaweed’s successor, is committing atrocities against non-Arab ethnic groups in Darfur, resembling the brutal tactics of the 2003-2005 Darfur genocide. It is committing the same atrocities and targeting the same indigenous groups, esp. the Masalit tribe.
- International responses must include enforcing UNSC resolutions on Darfur, expanding sanctions, and reviving the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as an emerging norm of international law.
- The AU should prioritize a comprehensive response to unfolding genocide in Darfur.
- States must intensify their coordination and efforts to apprehend ICC suspects.
- The conflict should not be oversimplified as an internal issue or power struggle between two generals. Regional powers and outside actors are complicit, through direct or indirect involvement, in fueling the conflict.
Brookings (Jeffrey Feltman), “Commentary: A way forward on Sudan” (Dec. 14, 2023)
Diplomatic progress was short-lived as Al Burhan denounced a communiqué from Dec. 10 IGAD summit that had suggested SAF and RSF heads would meet.
While the RSF is gaining ground, even if one side prevails over the other, insurgencies will persist. Neither an RSF-led nor an SAF-led regime would have legitimacy for Sudan’s civilians.
The international response has been insufficient, see terminating of UNITAMS mission rather than adjusting its mandate.
Some signs of renewed engagement, inc. Addis talks, IGAD summit, US acknowledging atrocity crimes and continuing to impose individual sanctions.
With civilian actors forging common positions and signs of renewed regional and international engagement, efforts should focus urgently on three areas:
Increased, immediate attention to Darfur.
A big increase in the humanitarian response.
Creation of a friends or contact group on Sudan to develop a set of principles among Sudan’s neighbors, regional and international organizations, and states with interests/influence in Sudan. Note it would not replace discussion between Sudanese but would forge consensus among external actors.
Could draw lessons from conflict in Ethiopia, where external divisions prolonged the fighting.
The New York Times (Alex de Waal and Abdul Mohammed), “The War the World Forgot” (Dec. 4, 2023)
There is a looming genocide in Darfur, and the Biden administration has taken insufficient action.
The Biden administration can take two key actions:
1. Stop the US’ Middle Eastern allies from arming the perpetrators, esp. discourage the UAE from arming the RSF. Biden should also appoint a presidential special envoy for Sudan, which Middle Eastern leaders are more likely to acknowledge.
2. Support a Kenyan-led African initiative to end the bloodshed. Biden should express support for Kenyan President William Ruto’s efforts to address the crisis. Ruto can work with Egypt and the UN special envoy to Sudan.
The RSF has gained ground in Darfur, raising questions about the future of Sudan as a unified entity. The RSF’s violence against the ethnically African Masalit tribe in West Darfur has led to mass killings.
The SAF controls aid deliveries from its administrative capital in Port Sudan and has restricted the flow of aid to areas under RSF control. Aid groups must prioritize getting aid into Darfur via cross-border mechanisms, but the RSF has repeatedly shown that it cannot act as a guarantor of the security needed to deliver aid.
The link between the RSF’s violence in West Darfur and the overall conflict between RSF and SAF relates to: (1) the failure of the RSF and SAF (former allies) to provide security in the region after the Al Bashir regime and (2) the failure of the international community to ensure there is minimum protection for civilians.
There needs to be diplomatic support to deploy a peacekeeping mission again within Darfur. The global community must push for a permanent ceasefire for all of Sudan. They should organize high-level discussions that do not exclude Egyptian or Emirati officials who are supporting opposite sides in the conflict.